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BIVENS v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS:
A NEW DIMENSION FOR THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
"Let the remedial process be inadequate or unjust and the
meaning of judicial review ceases to be clear."1
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the courts have tended to provide protections
for the vindication of constitutional rights. This is true despite
the fact that the United States Constitution is almost completely
silent concerning the remedies to be employed for its implementation. 2 The Supreme Court recognized some years ago,3 with
regard to the Fourth Amendment, 4 that state courts are inadequate to provide viable protections for a violation of the Amendment's commands. To further the interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment, the recent history of the Court's treatment
of the Amendment has been preoccupied with the question of
remedies for its violation 5 when federal officials act in excess
of their authority.
The Fourth Amendment provides that, "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated
In an attempt to guarantee the very words of the Amend..- 6
ment, the Court has recently held in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics7 that the
remedy to be employed on the occasion of federal misconduct is
an appropriate action for damages in a federal court. The
Court said:
In Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), we reserved the question
whether violation of that command by a federal agent acting
under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for
damages consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct. Today
we hold that it does. 8
1 Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and
The Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 41 (1968); See
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 409, 426 (1844).

2 A conspicuous exception is the reference to habeas corpus in U.S.

CONST. art. 1, §9.

3 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

5 Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109 (1969); Katz
The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and The Law of
Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1968).
6 U.S. CONST. amend IV.

" 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

8Id. at 389.

Hereinafter cited as Bivens.
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Apart from the holding of the case, the decision left unanswered the question of whether federal officials are immune
from suit, although, apparently, a cause of action still lies. This
article will discuss the immunity issue, along with other issues.
However, in order to appreciate what would otherwise appear to
be a simple holding, a brief history of case law prior to Bivens
is appropriate.
DEVELOPMENT BEFORE

Bivens

Pleading a Cause of Action in FederalCourt

Although the protection of federally granted rights was a
primary purpose for the establishment of a system of federal
courts," the principle established by the first Judiciary Act ° was
that private litigants must look to the state tribunals in the first
instance for vindication of federal claims, subject to limited
review by the Supreme Court." In the course of time, exceptions
were made for matters of a peculiarly federal nature 12 or where
political exigencies demanded.'8 Thus, when it came to suits for
damages for abuse of power, federal officials were usually governed by local law.'4 Federal law, however, supplied the defense,
9 For a general history of the federal judiciary, see Warren, New Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REV. 49
(1923), which is definitive on the subject it treats. See also H. HART & H.
WESCHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1-51 (1953);

Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal JudicialSystem, 13 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 3 (1948).
10 1 STAT. 92 (1789).

11 Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 3-4 (1817).
12 E.g. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). A
majority of the Supreme Court read §301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §185, as requiring the federal
courts to fashion and apply a federal common law of labor management
contracts. Though this interpretation poses its own problems, see Beckel
& Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1957), it obviates any jurisdictional problem,
since federal law then provides both the right and remedy, and the case
is one of true federal question jurisdiction.
1 E.g. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) where the Court, per Justice
Brennan, said:
In the instance of lack of jurisdiction the cause either does "arise under
the Federal Constitution, laws or treaties (or fall within one of the
other enumerated categories of Article III, §2), or is not a case or
controversy" within the meaning of this section; or the cause is not one
described by any jurisdictional. statute ... we hold only that the matter
set forth in the complaint does arise under the Constitution and is
within 29 U.S.C. §1343.
Id. at 198. Since the complaint was neither "frivolous nor insubstantial,"
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 683 (1946), the district court in Baker erred in
dismissing the complaint.
14Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947). Subsequently, in
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), where a constitutional right to
damages founded on the Fourth Amendment was not really in issue, the
court indicated doubt concerning the viability of such a cause of action.
"When it comes to suits for damage for abuse of power," the court said,
"federal officials are usually governed by local law." Id. at 652.
See also Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682

1972]

Bivens v. FederalBureau of Narcotics

if the conduct complained of was done pursuant to a federally
imposed duty. 15

The initial difficulty, then, was the inability to plead a
cause of action sufficient to enable a federal court to acquire
jurisdiction. For example, in a trespass action at law, the
traditional declaration could allege only the plaintiff's interest

and the defendant's intrusion.

That the defendant was dis-

charging an official duty was a defense which could be raised

only in answer.1 6 That the act was nevertheless unconstitutional1
was an attack on the defense to be made in the replication. '
For purposes of federal jurisdiction, such an action did not
satisfy the requirement that a federal question be stated in the
complaint.' 8 Thus, a damage action for a constitutional violation
was always cast in terms of a state created right and had to be
(1949)

("personal liability . . . sounding in tort."

Id. at 686); ("liability

imposed by the general law of torts." Id. at 695) ; Belknap v. Schild,
161 U.S. 10, 18 (1896) ("tort") ; Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S 508 518-19
(1893) ("tort"); Cunningham v. Macon and Brunswick Ry., 19 U.S. 446,
452 (1883) ("tort").
15 This is specifically granted by 28 U.S.C. §1442 (a) (1) (1948), which
reads in part:
A civil action . . . commenced in a State court against any of the

following persons may be removed by them to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein
it is pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or agency therof, or person
acting under him, for any act under color of such office ....
This provision gives the federal defendant a choice of forums which the
plaintiff does not have. See Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247 (1867) ;
cf. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879) ; Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
U.S. 647 (1963).
16 Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74-76 (1914); Joy v. St. Louis, 201
U.S. 332, 340 (1906).
1 Note 16 supra.
18 This is a subject unto its own.

Several tests have been advanced to
determine whether a case or controversy arises under the Constitution or
laws of the United States. Bearing in mind that 28 U.S.C. §1331 (a) confers
jurisdiction upon a district court "wherein the matter in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $10,000.00 exclusive of interests and costs, and arises
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States," the following
are notable examples of determining whether the jurisdictional statute is
satisfied:
(A) Jurisdiction is obtained whenever some element of federal law
is an "ingredient" of the cause of action. Osborn v. United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
(B) Justice Holmes' statement that "a suit arises under the law
that creates the cause of action." American Well Works Co. v.
Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
(C) "A suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of
the United States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone,
one arising under those laws. for a suit does not so arise unless
it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy
respecting the validity, construction, or effect of such a law,
upon the determination of which the result depends." Schulthis
v. McDoueal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912). Cf. First National
Bank v. Williams, 252 U.S. 504, 512 (1920).
(D) Jurisdiction must be determined from plaintiff's well-pleaded
complaint. Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199
(1877). For problems with this test, see McGoon v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 204 F. 998 (D.C.N.D. 1913), cited approvingly in
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brought in a state court because the federal right could not be
pleaded in the complaint. However, in equity, the traditional
bill 9 could anticipate defenses, and the constitutional claim could
2
justify the extraordinary grant of equitable relief . 0
Jurisdictionof a Federal Court in Suits of This Kind
The 1946 decision in Bell v. Hood' alleviated the problem of
pleading a cause of action in the federal court. On facts similar
to Bivens, the Supreme Court in Bell characterized the issue

of law as " [w] hether federal courts can grant money recovery
for damages said to have been suffered as a result of federal
officers violating the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 2 2 Recognizing that "that question has never been specifically decided
by this Court, ' 23 the Court did not decide it. Rather it held:
Peyton v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 316 U.S. 350, 352-53
(1942).
(E) Although the matter remains undecided by the Supreme Court,
a case "arising under" federal common law is a federal question
case and is within the original jurisdiction of the district court
as such. Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391
F.2d 486, 492-93 (2d Cir. 1968); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
U.S. 647, 665 (1963) (dissenting opinion); Stokes v. Adars,
265 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816 (1959) ;
Kurland, The Romero Case and Some Problems of Federal Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 817, 831-33 (1960); Comment,
Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional Approach to Erie, 73 YALE L. J. 325 (1964).
See generally, Note, Necessity that Federal Question Appear in the Complaint, 8 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 89 (1951); Note, 3 VAND. L. REV. 320 (1950).
For the present status of the problem, see note 32 infra.
19 Concerning the contents of the bill, see generally, 1 E. Daniel, CHANCERY PRACTICE 411-503; C. C. Langdell, A Summary of Equity Pleading,
ch. 1 (2d ed. 1883). The mere availability of equitable relief supported
the nonexistence of a legal remedy to redress violations of Fourth Amendment rights, under the well-established principle that an injunction will
issue only if there is no adequate remedy at law. See Bell v. Hood, 71 F.
Supp. 813, 819 (S.D. Cal. 1947). At that time the principle was codified, 28
U.S.C. §384 (1940).
20See generally, 1 J. Chitty, TREATISE ON PLEADINGS, 235-60, 390-414,
486-90, 518-42, 603-06, 617-24 (16 Am. ed. 1976); B. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK
OF COMMON LAW PLEADING, 208-13, 298-301, 366-81, (3d ed. H. W. Ballantine
1923). See also, Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270-71, 282-83 (1884)
(detinue) ; Chaffin v. Taylor, 114 U.S. 309 (1884) (trespass); Mitchell v.
Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 420 (1851) (trespass). Cf. Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74 (1914) (ejectment; Boston & Montana Consol. Copper &
Silver Mining Co. v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 188 U.S. 632, 638-39
(1903) (conversion). For examples of state cases, see Chase v. Sparhawk,
22 N.H. 134-35, 143 (1850) (trespass); Thames Mfg. Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn.
550 (1829) (trespass).
21327 U.S. 678 (1946).
22

Id. at 684.

Id.
Prior to Bell, one court dismissed a constitutional claim for
damages on the ground that the asserted constitutional rights merely
"lurk[ed] in the background. . ." in a manner not specified, Viles v. Symes,
129 F.2d 828, 831 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 711 (1942). Another court rejected such a claim in the apparent belief that federal question
jurisdiction was lacking under what is now 28 U.S.C. §1331 (a), unless the
case presents an issue of constitutional or statutory construction. Taylor v.
DeHart, 22 F.2d 206 (W.D. Mo. 1926), writ of 'errordismissed for want of
jurisdiction,274 U.S. 726 (1927).
23
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"[w] here legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute

provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done. 12 4 While failing to grant a specific remedy, the Bell Court
indicated a willingness to accept jurisdiction of suits of this kind,
declaring: "[T] he right of the petitioners to recover under their
complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and the laws of
the United States are given one construction and will be defeated
if they are given another. For this reason the District Court
' 25
has jurisdiction.

On remand, the district court held that the complaint failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, 26 stating
that in the absence of federal common law, the right of action
must be given either by the Constitution or by statute, and
neither granted such a right.2 7

For fourteen years the reasoning

of the district court has been followed, with little examination
28
or consideration.
The problematic approach to the issue of jurisdiction as an
independent consideration seems at best strange. That a United
States district court has jurisdiction in a suit for damages
against federal officers acting in excess of their authority appears
to have been settled much earlier than Bell. Indeed, cases be-

ginning with Little v. Barrene-9 upheld damages against a United
States Naval officer for his unlawful seizure of a vessel. So in
Tracey v. Swartwout"0 such jurisdiction was assumed. Again, in
Mitchell v. Harmony, 1 a judgment was affirmed by the Supreme

Court against military officers for unlawful seizure of private
property. In any event, Bell would seem to be dispositive on the
2
issue of federal jurisdiction.
REMEDIES AVAILABLE -

PRE-Bivens

Suppression Doctrine
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
24 327

Id.

U.S. at 684.

at 685 (Emphasis added).
26 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
27 Id.
at 817.
28 United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 1964),
cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 971 (1965); Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d 793, 796-97 (9th
Cir. 1957) ; Koch v. Zuieback, 194 F. Supp. 651, 656 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd
316 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963); Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F. Supp. 582, 586
(E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 290 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 827 (1961).
29 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
80 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80 (1886).
3l 54 U.S. (13 How.)
115 (1851); See also Cammeyer v. Newton, 94
U.S. 225 (1876) ; Belkamp v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1895) ;Cf. Taylor v. DeHart,
22 F.2d 206 (D.C. Mo. 1926), which appears to state the sole opposing view.
32 Significantly, in
the damage action against government officers in
25
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has long been held inadmissible in federal courts.33 The primary
controversy has been over whether the remedy of an exclusionary
rule was sufficiently important to the scheme of the Fourth
Amendment to require its application to state prosecutions as
well.
The ultimate resolution of this constitutional dispute turned
in large part on the Court's altered view of the viability of other
remedies for protecting the Fourth Amendment rights against
34
official lawlessness. The majority opinion in Wolf v. Colorado,
in refusing to hold the exclusionary remedy applicable to the
states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, remanded those
whose rights had been infringed to "the remedies of private
action and such protection as the internal discipline of the police,
under the eyes of an alert public opinion, may afford." 35 The
dissenters in Wolf warned that these alternative remedies were
illusory.80 In Mapp v. Ohio,87 the Court observed that the other
remedies had been "worthless and futile" and held that the
remedy of exclusion was required by the interests embodied in the
38
Fourth Amendment.
The effectiveness of the exclusionary rule, although questioned as of late,39 does much to implement the Fourth Amendment's commands. But that remedy cannot be realized unless
Bell, it was accepted that apart from the merits 'of the claim, its federal
character sufficiently appeared on the face of the complaint, and this has
been true of all subsequent cases of a similar character. See note 28 supra.
3 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
34338 U.S. 25 (1949).
35 Id. at 31.
36 The dissenting opinion by Justice Murphy, joined by Justice Rutledge.
discussing the inadequacy of the state remedial process, went on to say that:
The conclusion is inescapable that but one remedy exists to deter
violations of the search and seizure clause. That is the rule which
excludes iillegally obtained evidence.
Id. at 44.
367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961).
38 The Court concluded:
37

Our decision founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no
more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police
officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled,
and, to the courts, that judicial intregrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice.
Id. at 660. For further comment on the basis for, purpose, effectiveness, and
limitations of, the exclusionary rule, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ;
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 70 (1967) (dissenting opinion, Black, J.);
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Justice Black felt that "the
exclusionary rule formulated to bar such evidence in the Weeks case is not
rooted in the Fourth Amendment but rests on the 'supervisory power' of
this Court over other federal courts.. .. Id. at 76.
39
E.g., Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 667 (1970) where the author states that there is
no empirical evidence to support the claim that the rule deters illegal conduct
of law enforcement officials. For the most recent criticism of the exclusionary rule, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 510-27 (1971)
(dissenting opinion).
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a criminal prosecution is ultimately undertaken against a victim
of a Fourth Amendment intrusion. 40 Conversely, the exclusionary rule is no guarantee of the rights of those who are not
prosecuted. In some instances, then, the remedy may very well

do little to implement the Fourth Amendment.
Equitable and Legal Remedies
Federal judicial power to issue injunctions 41 and writs of

habeas corpus 4 2 in proper cases is beyond dispute, although the
target of an excessive violation of Fourth Amendment rights
is rarely aware of the planned action before it is consummated. 3
While a common law action for damages, primarily based on the
theory of trespass, is available, that remedy is often more conceptual than real. 4 4 Although a litigant is denied redress in a
federal court against federal officials, state officials are subject
5
to suit in federal courts by virtue of the Civil Rights Act.4
Thus, prior to Bivens, a litigant could avail himself of three
40 Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment will
generally support a motion to supress. The number of illegal arrests is,
with all candor, frightening. One author puts the number as several
million annually, and quotes other estimates as high as 31/ million. Hall,
Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 152, 154 (1953).
Another commentator estimated that 75% of all arrests were illegal in
some particular. Wainer, Investigating the Law of Arrest, 26 A.B.A.J.
151 (1940).
41 Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 620 (1912), held that a
federal court has jurisdiction over federal officers to enjoin threatened
action that is in "abuse of power." See also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908) ; United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
42 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 510 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter,
J.). Federal mandamus jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §1361 (1964), may also be of
help occasionally.
43 Buck v. Colbath 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1865); Teal v. Fetten, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 136 (1951).
44For indicative examples of inadequate state remedial process, see
Mason v. Wrightson, 109 A.2d 1928 (Md. 1954) (an award of one cent);
Goodwin v. Allen, 89 Ga. App. 187, 78 S.E.2d 804 (1953) (obvious false
imprisonment but jury returned verdict for the defendant); Butcher v.
Adams, 310 Ky. 205, 220 S.W.2d 398 (1949) (plaintiff who had a record of
prior arrests, could not have been humiliated and therefore was not damaged) ; Trahan v. Breaux, 212 La. 457, 32 So. 2d 845 (1947), (in the absence
of special damages, only nominal damages allowed for false imprisonment).
45 J.S.C. §1983 (1964) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any right, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedng for redress.
See generally, id., §§1981-88. Section 1983 is applicable only to state officers,
not federal officials. Cf. the recent case, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88 (1971), which held that 42 U.S.C. §1985 does not apply only to conspiracies operated under color of state law but also includes unconstitutional
private action. Whether this case will have any bearing on §1983 situations
remains to be seen. Presently, a state offlcer is liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983
for his acts in connection with an arrest if (1) he acts under color of
state law, and (2) he deprives the arrested person of a right secured by
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remedies: the exclusionary rule, but only in a federal prosecution; equitable remedies, but only if he could show continued

federal misconduct; and a damage action in a state court. The
latter remedy is criticized on jurisdictional grounds.

How a

state court can assume jurisdiction over federal officials acting
under color of federal authority and in furtherance of federal
purposes, albeit in excess of their authority, is not apparent.
In re Neage4 held that state courts do not have jurisdiction to
issue injunctions against federal officials. If a state court does
not have power to prevent such acts for want of jurisdiction, it
would seem to lack power over federal officials once they have so
acted.47 While there is federal jurisdiction to issue injunctions to
prevent the commission of federal official lawlessness,'4 a person
seeking both equitable and damage relief could only invoke
federal court jurisdiction at the cost of splitting his claim.'9
The discussion above should indicate that had the Fourth
Amendment never been written, exclusive recourse to the traditional common law remedy of trespass might be understand-

able. But in light of the Fourth Amendment, suits of this kind
are uniquely federal in nature, and this was to be the mood of
the Bivens Court.
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES -

THE

Bivens CASE

At about 6:30 on the morning of November 26, 1965, the
respondents, as agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
forced their way into Webster Bivens' home with drawn firearms
and proceeded to search the premises. The agents forcibly handfederal law. However, he is not liable if there was probable cause for
the arrest or if he acted under a honest misunderstanding of the law or
the facts. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) ; Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91 (1945) ; Joyce v. Ferrazzi, 323 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1963). Thus,
only action taken under color of state, not federal, law is reached by the
section. For general analysis and discussion of litigation under §1983 and
its predecessors, see Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the
Frontiers Beyond 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277 (1965); Klitgaard, The Civil
Rights Act and Mr. Monroe, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 145 (1961), Selected Essays
(1963); Notes, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe
v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486 (1969) ; Civil Rights and State Authority:
Toward the Production of a Just Equilibrium, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 831; The
Civil Rights Act of 1871; Continuing Vitality, 40 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 70
(1964); The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Act, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1285
(1953). On the question of monetary damages, see Niles, Civil Actions for
Damages Arising Out of the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEx. L. REV.
1015 (1967).
46135 U.S. 1 (1890).

4,See Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers,

73 YALE
L.J. 1385 (1964).
8

' Note 41 supra. See also McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
598 (1821), holding that state courts have no mandamus jurisdiction over
federal officers.
49See H. HART & H. WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM, 220-251.
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cuffed Bivens in the presence of his wife and children, placing
him under arrest for violation of the narcotics law. Bivens

was taken into custody to be questioned, fingerprinted, photographed and booked, as well as subjected to a thorough and
humiliating search of his person. A United States Commissioner,
finding that the agents acted without the authority of a search or
50
arrest warrant, dismissed the complaint.
Bivens, acting pro se, filed a civil complaint in the United
States district court. He alleged that the arrest and subsequent search were made without a warrant, that unreasonable
force was employed, and that the arrest was made without
probable cause. Bivens alleged, as Bell had done some years
before, that the court had jurisdiction by virtue of 42 U.S.C.
§1983,'5 1 28 U.S.C. §1343(3),52 28 U.S.C. §1343(4), 5- and 28
U.S.C. §1331 (a) 4

The district court

5

and the court of appeals5 6 dismissed

the complaint. The court of appeals, however, gave the subject
a more extensive analysis than it had theretofore received in any

court.

The court did not question its power to devise remedies

50 Brief for Appellants at 2-3.
Note 45 supra.
5228 U.S.C. §1343(3) 1952) provides that:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person ...
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance or regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or by any act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States.
Like §1983, only action under color of state law is reached by this section.
53 28 U.S.C. §1343(4) (1952) provides that:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person...
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable relief or other relief
under any Act of Congress provided for the protection of civil
rights, including the right to vote.
To come within the above section, plaintiff must be seeking relief "under any
Act of Congress." In this case, plaintiff sought relief which was not extended
by any Act of Congress, but rather based on the Fourth Amendment.
5428 U.S.C. §1331(a) (1958) provides that:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil action
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interests and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.
Bivens satisfied the jurisdictional amount, seeking $15,000 from each of
the six agents. It is striking that, prior to 1875, Congress deemed it neither
necessary nor appropriate to provide a federal court for the litigation of
rights under the Constitution. The general federal question jurisdiction
was first created by the Act of March 3, 1875, §2, 18 STAT. 470-71, now
embodied in the above statute. There has always been a minimum jurisdictional amount, unless so dispensed with by special statutory provision,
as in the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983; see 28 U.S.C. §1343 and note 18
sup'ra.
55276 F. Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
56409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969).
51
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for the enforcement of constitutionally protected rights, but the
court, as did the courts before, thought this primarily to be the
prerogative of Congress, and indicated that only a showing of
great necessity would justify independent judicial action.57 The
opinion is replete with statements that judicial development of
constitutional remedies can proceed only when such a course is
"essential"; otherwise, a failure to act when essential would
leave the protection of the Constitution "illusory" and "only a
'form of words'." 58

The Supreme Court rejected the "essential" test of the court
of appeals in its reversal. 59 Rather, it saw the heart of the
question as whether a federal right was in issue. "Where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule
from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."60 If the federal
officer is acting beyond his authority, the litigant's remedy is by
an injunction on the equity side of the federal court;," if the
federal right has been abridged, the remaining judicial remedy
against the federal officer is by an action for damages on the
law side of the federal court. 2 Thus, it would seem to make no
difference whether the suit against a federal officer for "abuse
of power" is for damages resulting from an abuse committed,
or is for an injunction to restrain an abuse threatened, for in
either case, "[T] he interest which Bivens claims - to be free
from official conduct in contravention of the Fourth Amendment
8' 6
is a federally protected interest.
57 Id. at 726. The court accepted the notion that constitutional remedies
may be judicially devised, pointing to the injunction as a conspicuous example. Id. at 723. The court also acknowledged that, in a proper case,
such a remedy might be a judgment for damages. Id. at 724.

"' Id.at 723-25. The Court of Appeals made much of the fact that
Congress had legislated extensively concerning the problem of illegal

searches and seizures and had expressly provided for civil liability in a

particular class of cases.

Id. at 725.

However, the Court did not suggest

that the civil and criminal provisions enumerated by it were intended by
Congress to be exclusive.
59403 U.S. 388 (1971). Justice Brennan spoke for a majority of five.
Justice Harlan wrote a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Black and Blackmun filed dissenting opinions.
60 Id. at 392.
61 Note 41 supra. See also Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 696-697 (1949) ; Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, (1946) ;
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196

(1882).
82 This is especially true in light of article III, §2, which provides that,
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Ca8es, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States . . ." (Emphasis
added).
Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, providing that
"There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action'" seems
to support the contention made. There is no longer, in federal practice,
such a thing as a "suit in equity." Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Friedman,

139 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1944).
996 (D.C. Ohio, 1952).
88 403 U.S. at 400.

United States v. Rosenbluth, 102 F. Supp.
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The apparent ease with which the Court granted the remedy
in the absence of a statute providing the same may perhaps

appear to be unrealistic, especially in light of the fact that so
many lower federal courts had denied the remedy.64 In an
obvious distaste for such cases, the Court simply stated that:
The question is merely whether-petitioner, if he can demonstrate
an injury consequent upon the violation by federal agents of his
Fourth Amendment rights, is entitled to redress his injury
through a particular remedial mechanism normally available in
the federal courts.

65

The effect of Bivens cannot be understated.

However, the

opinion may raise more questions than those which it answered.

This leads to a consideration of those issues which the Court
may inevitably face.
THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Although Bivens upheld a right of suit against federal
agents who had violated Fourth Amendment rights while acting
under color of their authority, the Court reversed the issue as

to the federal officials' immunity to suit. The Court held that:
"... [T] he District Court ruled that.., respondents were im-

mune from liability by virtue of their official position.

276 F.

Supp., at 15. This question was not passed upon by the Court of
Appeals, and accordingly we do not consider it here.'66
Obviously, if the Bivens decision is to render federal officials
subject to damage actions in a federal court they, like state
officials, must be free from any immunity. As the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is a broad one indeed, only a few remarks
6 7
will be made here, as it is fully discussed elsewhere.
It is well established that the United States may not be
64

Note 28 supra.
403 U.S. at 395. In addition the Court said:
That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation
of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials should hardly seem a
surprising proposition. Historically, damages have been regarded as the
ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.
Id. at 395. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902);
Wiley v. Sinkler, 185 U.S. 487 (1902) ; J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
AND THE SUPREME COURT 28ff.
(1966); N. LASON, HISTORY AND DEVELOP65

MENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

43ff. (1937) ; Katz, The Jurisprudenceof Remedies: ConstitutionalLegality
and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8-33 (1968);
cf. West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78 (1894); Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U.S. 17

(1884).
66

403 U.S. at 397-98.

Block, Suits Against Government Offcers and the Sovereign Immunity
Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV., 1060 (1946). Cf. Guthrie, The Eleventh Article
of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 8 COLUM. L. REV.
183 (1908).
67
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sued without its consent.6 8 Absolute immunity to suit has been
applied to federal officers in respect of ". . action . . taken...
within the outer perimeter . . ."9 of his line of duty. But it has
never been suggested that the immunity reaches beyond that
perimeter, so as to shield a federal officer acting wholly on his
own. A federal officer remains liable for acts committed "manifestly or palpably beyond his authority."7 0 Therefore, when the
federal officer is within the scope of his authority, no suit will lie
because the United States may not be sued. 71 Conversely, a federal
officer whose acts are "flagrant and patently unjustified" 72 loses
his immunity to suit and in such a case he is "[s] tripped of his
in his person
official or representative character and is subjected
7
to the consequences of his individual conduct. 3
Quite apart from the rationale of the above, 74 it is manifestly clear that, when an officer is acting unconstitutionally,
he is not acting within his federal authority and has therefore
lost his substantive immunity from suit.7 5 But it does not follow
68 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) ;
Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937); Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331
(1907); Cunningham v. Macon & B. Ry., 109 U.S. 446 (1883); United States
v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); United States v. Tillor, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
484 (1867) ; United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 151 (1834).
69 The question of authority is, of course, distinct from that of immunity
from civil suit. Even an unauthorized act may be within the scope of the
immunity, so long as it is within the "outer perimeter" of the officer's "line
of duty." Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959). See also Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949); cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1949);
Restatement of Torts §656 comment d (1938) extends immunity only as
far as public prosecutors; the privilege "does not apply to all persons whose
function it is to aid in the enforcement of the criminal law."
70 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498, (1895); see Colpoys v. Gates,
118 F.2d 16 (D.C. 1941); Kozlowski v. Ferrara, 117 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) ; Note, Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARv.
L. REV. 827, 835 (1957). Liberally construed, see Virginia Islands Corp. v.
W. A. Taylor & Co., 202 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1953); 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
(2d ed. 1948).
71 The district court in Bivens confused the question of federal authority
with the question of governmental immunity. The distinction between the
two was made in Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682 (1949). The Supreme Court held that, if the actions of federal officers
create personal liability, the mere fact of their office will not bar an action
against them; personal liability arises where the officer exercises power
beyond the limits imposed by the definition of his authority or where his
authority or its exercise is unconstitutional. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967) which qualified this statement. However, if the remedy to be
applied requires official action it constitutes relief running directly against
the government, which may not be had in the absence of the government's
consent to be sued, an unlikely event.
72 Bivens, 403 U.S. 411 (concurring opinion, Harlan, J.).
73 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
74

See C.

WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE UNITED STATES HISTORY,

717 (2d ed. 1926), where the author states that the decision in Ex parte
Young rests on pure fiction and is illogical. However, "[t]he authority
and finality of Ex parte Young can hardly be overestimated." Hutcheson,
A Case for Three Judges, 47 HARv. L. REV. 795, 799 n.9 (1934).
75 Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 619-20 (1912) ; Nationwide
Charters & Conventions, Inc., v. Garber, 254 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mass. 1966).
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that he has lost his character as a federal officer. He is still
acting under color of federal law.76 If the Court admits that it
has equitable power over a federal officer preparing to act unconstitutionally, 77 it must follow that the Court has power over him
when he has so acted.7 8 The proposition that individuals are
protected by the Bill of Rights only against the prospective
unconstitutional activity of federal agents is patently absurd.
Indeed, the reluctance of the majority in Bivens to assert the
absence of immunity where it is alleged that the federal officer
has acted "under color of federal authority" leaves the plaintiff
in a position not far removed from the position that he was in
prior to the Court's opinion.
EXPRESS NEGATIVE THEORY AND RAMIFICATIONS OF

IMPLICATIONS

Bivens

The concurring opinion of Justice Harlan7 9 and the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger 9 indicate that the
Bivens decision may have a far-reaching effect not consciously
noted by the majority. Indeed Harlan implies that a remedy
in damages for violation of other constitutional provisions may
lie:
The contention that federal courts are powerless to accord a litigant

damages for a claimed invasion of his federal constitutional rights
until Congress explicitly authorizes the remedy cannot rest on the
notion that the decision to grant compensatory relief involves a
resolution of policy considerations not susceptible of judicial discernment."1

Thus Harlan would say that mere silence on the part of
Congress is not decisive at all. Where statutes have been silent
as to any private relief, federal courts have found a cause of
action to exist for violation, for example, of the Fair Labor
Standard Act,

82

the Securities Exchange Act,83 the National

76 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 397-98 (1914).
Cf. the
treatment of state officials exceeding their authority in Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 183-87 (1961).
77 Bivens, 409 F.2d at 723 (1969) ; see note 41 supra.
78 Consider the language in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882):
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer
of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers
of the government, from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the
law, and are bound to obey it.
Id. at 220.
79 403 U.S. 388, 398-411.
80

Id. at 411-27. The Chief Justice, while recognizing that "It]his case
has significance far beyond its facts and its holdings," Id. at 412, suggested
a number of alternatives to the holding in Bivens.
81 403 U.S. at 402.

Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) ; Deckert v. Independence
Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) ; Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th
Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951);
82
8"
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Banking Act,8' the Federal Communications Act,1' the National
Labor Relations Act,88 the Federal Aviation Act,87 and the Rivers
and Harbor Act.88 "If a private action is necessary to carry
it into effect, the legislature must be credited with intent to
provide such a remedy." 811 It is suggested here that the same
statement may be made for the Constitution in those instances

where a private action is necessary to carry into effect the intent
of its provisions, independent of Congressional sanction.

Three cases may support this proposition, although no one
case is dispositive without the reasonable implications inherent
in Bivens. The case of Jacobs v. United States" may present the

purest example of a constitutional right with a necessarily implied remedy. In Jacobs, the construction of a dam by the government caused repeated overflows onto the plaintiff's land, which the

Court found to constitute a taking of private property within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.9 ' It may be doubted
whether plaintiff could have sued for just compensation absent
in the Tucker Act,92 which grants to the district courts and the
court of claims jurisdiction over claims against the government "founded on the Constitution," and on an implied contract.
But given this general jurisdictional grant, analogous to 28
U.S.C. §1331(a) 93 in Bivens, the damage remedy was implied
from the constitutional right itself.9 4 The right to just compensation can scarcely be vindicated other than by securing just
compensation. Thus, the Court read the Fifth Amendment as
self-executing, creating a duty to pay upon the government, de-

spite the absence of specific statutory authorization for suits to
Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 240-47 (2d Cir. 1944) (Judge Clark, dissenting in part but writing for the court on this issue).
84 Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940), rehearing denied, 309 U.S.
697. (1940).
85 Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
88 Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323
U.S. 210 (1944).
.
Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.
1956). Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Col. 1961).
88 United States v. Perma Paning, 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964).
.9 Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Actions, 27 HARv. L. Ruv. 317, 331
(1914).
Vo 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
91 Initially, the language of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is
strikingly dissimilar.

The language of the Fifth Amendment -

".

.

. nor

shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation ... "
- certainly creates a duty to pay and that duty inescapably implies a
right to recover. However, the certainty of such remedy, absent judicial
construction, is more fiction than fact. See note 94 infra.
92 U.S.C.§§1346(a) (2), 1491 (1948).
93 Note 54 supra.
94 Substantial doubt has been expressed about the validity of this
holding. See Note, Developments in the Law - Remedies Against the
United States and Its Officials, 70 HAav. L. RaV. 827, 876-81 (1957).

19721

Bivens v. FederalBureau of Narcotics

enforce the right to just compensation.
The voting rights cases are also helpful in the analysis.
Both of these cases, Swafford v. Templeton", and Wiley v.

Sinkler,1 involved the same issues.

Plaintiffs sued election

officials in federal court for damages for denial of their right
to vote in congressional elections, based primarily on the Fif-

teenth Amendment." The Court held that the right to vote
had "its foundation in the Constitution of the United States"99
and that "[t]he action sought the vindication or protection of

the right to vote for a member of Congress, a right . . 'fundamentally based upon the Constitution . . .'."100 Although the
voting rights decisions were addressed to jurisdiction rather
than the right to relief, they have precedent value as recognizing

a constitutional basis for a claim to damages.
The point to be made is this: that where the Constitution
contains express negatives, as in the Bill of Rights and elsewhere,01 ' no other basis for the judicial creation of standards

may be required. To draw a distinction between the fashioning
of a remedy where a federal statute provides none' 02 and when
the Constitution provides none is unjustified. In both cases the
same problem exists, namely, one of construction.'03 This is
95 290 U.S. at 16.
For other indicative instances where the courts have
read the Fifth Amendment as self-executing, see Battaglia v. General Motors
Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) (dictum), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887
(1948); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 216 (1882) (a common law
action of ejectment against federal officers).
96 185 U.S. 487 (1902).
97 179 U.S. 58 (1900).
98 The applicable constitutional provision provides that "The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied . . .by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."
9o 179 U.S. at 62.

100 185 U.S. at 492.

101 E.g., The Third Amendment provides:

No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law;
and the Twenty-fourth Amendment provides:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any prim try or other
election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or
Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of
failure to pay any poll or other tax.
These two amendments, as well as the Fourth, Fifth and Fifteenth Amendments, contain within them express negatives. Where, in order to effect
the intent of these provisions a private action for damages is necessary,
the text indicates that no specific legislation need be enacted as a condition
precedent.
102 See notes 82-88 supra; see generally, Note, Federal Jurisdiction in
Suits for Damages Under Statutes not Affording Such Remedy, 48 COLUM.
L. REv. 1090 (1948).
103 The word "construction" has been used for lack of a better term.
The exercise of judicial power involved in those cases cited at notes 82-88
supra simply cannot be justified in terms of statutory construction; see Hill,
Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1109, 1120-21 (1969); nor did
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especially true when it is considered that federal statutes gain

04
all their source and authority from the Constitution itself.

Furthermore, no state's interests are frustrated by the
judicial construction of an "express negative theory."105 "[A]ctions against federal officials . . are necessarily of federal concern . . .,"10oand no state interest is infringed by a generous
construction of federal jurisdiction; rather, every consideration

of practicality and justice argues for such a consideration.'0
Nor will judicial recognition of a private damage action
under an express negative theory carry with it an undue burden
of developing a body of federal common law. Recognition of
a federal claim ". . . does not require the fashioning of a whole
new body of federal law, but merely removes a bar to access .... "
to existing law . 0° 8 A body of federal common law would govern
such questions as the types of damages recoverable, the types of
injuries compensable, the extent to which official immunity is
available as a defense, and the degree of evil intent which is
necessary to state a meritorious cause of actions. 0 9
CONCLUSION

The theme of this comment is that where constitutionally
defined interests are involved, they are particularly of a federal

nature, and should be decided by federal law in a federal forum.
The opinion in Bivens would certainly support this statement.
those cases purport to do so. "The notion of 'implying' a remedy, therefore,
can only refer to a process whereby the federal judiciary exercises a
choice among traditionally available judicial remedies according to reasons
related to the substantive social policy embodied in an act of positive law."
Bivens, 403 U.S. n.4 at 402-03 (Harlan, J., concurring opinion) (Emphasis
in original).
104 U.S. CONST., art. I, §8.
105 This assumes, of course, that a state has a "true" interest in a damage action against federal officials, apart from the obvious interest of
compensating its citizens for injuries suffered by federal lawlessness, which
may not always be the case. See note 44 and text at note 46 supra.
10 Weschsler, Federal Jurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 220 (1948).

107 Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 653 (1963) (dissenting opinion,
Brennan, J.).
108 Moragne v. States Marine Lives, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 405-06 (1970).
109 The road has been well travelled in federal suits against state
officials. See e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (immunity) ; Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-88 (1961) (immunity); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233
U.S. 318 (1914) (statute of limitations) ; Basista v. Weir 340 F.2d 74
(3d Cir. 1965) (damages recoverable and injuries compensable).
The discussion in the text has dwelt on the compensatory aspect of
the damage action. In theory, damages also serve the end of deterrence,
but it is doubtful that, police misconduct is in fact deterred by such. Foote,
Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV.
493 (1955) ; and it is not clear that the situation would be materially changed
by a stringent federal rule regarding exemplary damages, assuming this to
be desirable. Conceivably, the deterrent aspect of the damage remedy
assumes greater relevance in other classes of official misconduct.
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Yet only a liberal interpretation of Bivens can support the proposition that in the absence of legislation specifically authorizing
remedial relief, the Court should treat the Constitution no differently from a federal statute in permitting a private action
to affect the policies embodied in the positive law. While the
majority opinion does not reach this position, the Court may
very well accept such a conclusion in the future.
Jack A. Maloof

